“The recent Ukrainian campaigns have highlighted the asymmetry in innovation and command philosophies between the Ukrainian and Russian militaries,” says Mick Ryan, a retired Australian major general, in a guest essay
Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, published an article that explored Russia’s war aims in Ukraine. It was a succinct assessment from the man who has led Ukraine’s defence since Russia’s invasion in February. “There is every reason to believe that [the war] is not going to end anywhere within 2022,” he wrote.
The Ukrainian military strategy might best be described as a strategy of corrosion. The Ukrainians, through indirect attacks, information operations, destruction of Russian logistics and commanders, and tough close combat, have corroded Russian soldiers’ physical, moral, and intellectual capacity to fight. In the war’s initial phase, the Ukrainians did this against the northern Russian expedition, forcing a Russian withdrawal.
By late in the northern summer, the Ukrainians had already launched a campaign to seize back the strategically decisive southern provinces. Throughout August progress had been slow, however. The Russians deployed additional reinforcements to the region. And while the Ukrainians were making progress attacking Russian logistics, commanders and important transport nodes, there was a sense among some observers that the broader war could become another Donbas-like meat grinder.
On October 2nd, the situation got even worse for Russia. General Andriy Kovalchuk’s forces in the south, having identified several weak points in Russian defensive lines north of Kherson, launched an offensive that quickly broke through them. The Ukrainians, like their compatriots in the north-east, advanced as far south as Dudchany in a matter of days.